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Over the past decades, household incomes have become more unequally distributed
in most OECD countries. The United States is among the countries recording the
largest levels and increases in inequality (cf. OECD 2008). The usual approach for
evaluating the role of taxation as a driver of overall inequality trends is to compare
income inequality measures before and after taxes (see e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding
1997 or Heathcote et al. 2010). However, tax burdens and their impact on the income
distribution are determined by both tax schedule and tax base. For instance, a given
progressive income tax schedule redistributes more when the distribution of taxable
incomes becomes more dispersed, and very little if everybody earns about the same
(Musgrave and Thin 1948 and Dardanoni and Lambert 2002). At the same time, the
U.S. tax system has seen a large number of changes due to policy reforms (such as
lower marginal tax rates and a reduced number of tax brackets in the 1980s or a more
generous Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC, in the 1990s). Given the importance of
the distribution of market income for redistribution, it is however unclear how much
of an observed change in tax burdens is due to policy reforms and what part is due to
other factors, notably the underlying distribution of market income (as well as other
tax—relevant population characteristics, such as family structures).1
We assess the eﬀect of tax reforms on economic inequality in the U.S. over the
1978—2009 period. We pay special attention to separating the direct eﬀects of policy
reforms from other factors, including indirect policy eﬀects due to behavioral responses
(Poterba 2007). To isolate the pure policy eﬀects, we perform a series of detailed
counterfactual simulations that show what the income distribution would have been
if either tax policy or, alternatively, the distribution of the tax base had remained
unchanged between two given years. In combination with a decomposition analysis
based on Shorrocks (1999)’s reinterpretation of the Shapley value, these simulation
results enable us to split changes in inequality into a direct tax policy eﬀect and other
factors which impact on income distribution.2 By repeating the analysis for each year,
this method allows us to reassess whether major U.S. tax reforms during the past three
decades have either slowed or exacerbated the trend towards greater income inequality.
This paper adds to the literature analyzing pre— and post—tax income inequality in
the U.S. since the late 1970s by using micro data from the Current Population Survey
1Note that even without changes to the tax schedule, the tax system becomes more progressive
if taxable incomes grows faster than the indexation of tax brackets — this is known as ’bracket creep’
(see e.g. Saez 2003 and Immervoll 2005).
2Our approach formalizes analyses of policy eﬀects, as performed for instance by Clark and Leices-
ter (2004) for the United Kingdom. See also Bargain and Callan (2010) for France and Ireland. A
related concept for the comparison of tax regimes with respect to progressivity — the transplant-and-
compare procedure (Dardanoni and Lambert 2002) — is applied by Lambert and Thoresen (2009) for
Norway. They isolate the tax policy eﬀect by comparing pre-tax income distributions which have been
adjusted to a common base.
1(CPS).3 Our analysis is a natural follow—up of the study by Piketty and Saez (2007).
While they use the NBER’s TAXSIM calculator to compute changing tax burdens
over time and assess their impact on changes in progressivity of the federal income tax
system, we investigate their impact on changes in inequality. The novelty of our paper is
that we explicitly distinguish between the measured redistributive eﬀect of tax reforms
(as a combination of tax policy and tax base distribution changes) on the one hand and
the pure policy eﬀect on the other hand. The former emerges from simple comparisons
of pre— and post—tax income, whereas the latter results from our decomposition analysis
based on counterfactual policy simulations using the TAXSIM model. We quantify the
distributional impact of speciﬁc tax policy changes and compare its magnitude to other
drivers of inequality changes.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. The increase in post—tax income inequality was
slower than that of pre—tax inequality indicating that the redistributive role of the tax
system has increased over time. However, our decomposition reveals that most of this
increase in redistribution was not due to the policy eﬀect but a mechanical consequence
of the rising inequality in pre—tax income. Indeed, the eﬀects of policy changes more or
less canceled out over the period as a whole — which is a direct consequence of partisan
politics. Our ﬁndings are in line with popular perceptions regarding the political cycle,
with disequalizing (equalizing) eﬀects observed for policy changes implemented during
Republican (Democrat) administrations (see Bartels 2008). The results for some sub—
periods show large eﬀects for actual policy changes — sometimes accounting for more
than 50 percent of the increase in post—tax inequality (Tax Reform Act of 1986).
There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between results for the lower and upper parts of
the distribution. Policy reforms enacted in the early and mid 1990s reduced income
gaps at the bottom to below their 1978 values. The equalizing eﬀect of tax policy
on inequality at the lower half of the distribution is maintained until the end of the
observation period and even enforced by provisions enacted through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. By contrast, no equalizing eﬀects of policies can be
discerned for the upper part of the distribution. Instead, for the period as a whole, tax
policy changes aﬀecting top—income earners appear to have slightly exacerbated trends
towards widening income gaps at the top.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing U.S.
income inequality literature and particularly focuses on the impact of tax policy on the
income distribution. The decomposition analysis, the data and income concepts are
described in section 3. Results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3See e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010), Meyer and Sullivan (2010), Meyer and Sullivan (2011) for studies
also based on CPS data and Piketty and Saez (2007) who use tax return data.
22 Literature
Rising income inequality in the U.S. has stimulated a large body of research examining
the underlying driving factors. In this literature, several strands have emerged which
focus on diﬀerent types of inequality. While the focus of this paper is on redistribution
and the impact of tax policy on trends in post—tax income inequality, the latter cannot
be comprehensively assessed without taking into account trends in pre—tax inequality.
The development of wage and earnings inequality has triggered a vast amount of
research. A key result of the literature is that wage inequality increased substantially
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. For instance, Gottschalk and Danziger (2005)
ﬁnd that the development of male wage and family income inequality were largely
comparable over the period 1975 to 2002.4 Autor et al. (2008) provide an overview of
the literature on U.S. wage inequality and discuss if the substantial increase since the
1980s can be considered as an episodic event or a continuous development.5
Two explanations for a rising wage dispersion are globalization and skill—biased
technological change. Both may have a negative eﬀect on wages of low—skilled workers,
but a positive one on those of the high—skilled. While there is a direct channel from
individual wage to family income inequality, other trends than those aﬀecting individual
wage inequality clearly coexist and impact trends in family income. Among those, the
labor force participation of women, assortative mating and other aspects of family
formation have been discussed in the literature.6
Moving from the individual to the household level, income inequality widened in
the 1970s (cf. Lindert 2000) and continued to rise sharply in the 1980s. Studies using
the CPS ﬁnd that total income inequality, i.e. inequality in pre—tax, post—transfer
income rose sharply in the 1980s, and that this growth continued at a reduced pace
in the 1990s and early 2000s.7 Evidence for the trend in pre—tax income inequality
since the 1990s that seems to be contrasting at ﬁrst glance, however, is reported by
Piketty and Saez (2003) (updated 2008) who build series of top income shares based
4They further report that male wage and earnings inequality had similar trends, though earnings
inequality showed a cyclical pattern due to changes in hours worked at the bottom of the distribution.
Contrary, caused by the increase in hours worked of females at the bottom of the distribution, female
earnings inequality decreased over the last three decades and thus reversed the trend of growing wage
inequality.
5See e.g. Card and DiNardo (2002) for the former argument, whereas Autor et al. (2008) ﬁnd
support for the latter. They show that while male wage inequality in the lower half of the distribution
grew strongly in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s and declined afterwards, inequality in the upper half of the
distribution kept growing in the 1990s and 2000s.
6It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a general discussion of the sources contributing
to an increase in inequality or to quantify the contributions of certain factors aﬀecting inequality (see
e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for the ﬁrst and Burtless (1999), Daly and Valletta (2006) or
Larrimore (2010) for the latter point).
7See e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), Burkhauser et al. (2009), Meyer and Sullivan (2010),
Heathcote et al. (2010), Burkhauser et al. (2011b). Diﬀerences between these studies exist with
regard to the deﬁnition of the income unit (family vs. household), sample selection (full population
vs. working-age population) and whether or not topcoding in the public-use CPS is accounted for.
3on tax return data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). They ﬁnd that the share
of income held by the richest groups grew in the 1990’s, and with the exception of
the period 2000—2002, continued to rise in the following years.8 Burkhauser et al.
(2011a) seek to reconcile some of the ﬁndings from these two data sources. They use
internal CPS data which are — compared with public—use CPS — much less aﬀected
by topcoding (although a number of other measurement and conceptual diﬀerences
remain) and apply similar income deﬁnitions as Piketty and Saez (2003) do, namely
pre—transfer, tax—unit income. They conclude that the rise in inequality from 1993
onwards is mainly due to gains made by the top 1 percent of the income distribution.
Recent studies which analyze trends in post—tax income inequality and redistribu-
tion in the U.S. are Meyer and Sullivan (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010). The former
ﬁnd that post—tax income inequality started to increase later (in the late 1970s) than
that of pre—tax income and that its increase in the 1980s occurred at a slower rate.
Somewhat contrasting, one ﬁnding of the latter is that trends in pre— and post—tax
income inequality had been similar in the 1980s, but the gap widened (and redistribu-
tion therefore increased) in the 1990s.9 A large part of redistribution in the U.S. takes
place through tax expenditures. Since 1986, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
has been extended in several steps and nowadays represents an important element of
the federal tax system in terms of redistribution to the working—poor.10 However, the
redistributive capacity of the income tax system does depend — besides tax expendi-
tures — on many factors such as the degree of progressivity, the relative importance of
certain components and the distribution of pre—tax income.11
Our paper contributes to the strand of the literature which examines the impact of
tax policy on post—tax income inequality. By extracting the direct policy eﬀect through
counterfactual simulations, we complement analyses conducted by Piketty and Saez
(2007) or the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2010). In these studies, shares of post—tax
income and average federal tax rates are calculated for all income groups and similar
time periods, but the estimates do not allow to isolate the direct policy eﬀect since
they reﬂect both legislative changes as well as other factors which inﬂuence tax rates.
Some studies have conducted so—called “what if” calculations (cf. Poterba (2007), p.
8Further studies relying on IRS tax return data are Slemrod (1992), Feenberg and Poterba (1993),
DeBacker et al. (2010) and Bakija et al. (2010) who, in particular, look at top incomes, though this
list is not exhaustive.
9Note that a key diﬀerence between these two studies is the selection of the sample. While Meyer
and Sullivan (2010) use the full CPS sample, the household-level sample in Heathcote et al. (2010) is
restricted to those households with at least one member in working-age.
10See e.g. Hotz and Scholz (2003), Meyer (2010) and Eissa and Hoynes (2011) who document the
growing redistributive impact of this program.
11For studies examining the progressivity of the tax system, see e.g. Kasten et al. (1994), Bishop
et al. (1997), Alm et al. (2005) and Piketty and Saez (2007). The latter ﬁnd that the progressivity
of the overall federal tax system declined substantially at the top of the income distribution since the
1960s. Mitrusi and Poterba (2000) describe the growing importance of payroll taxes relative to the
income tax since the early 1980s.
4630) but to the best of our knowledge, none of these papers have sought to identify
a policy eﬀect on a year—by—year basis over a long time period. We are aware of two
contributions which explicitly consider — via counterfactual simulations — the impact of
tax policy on the post—tax income distribution. In an analysis of policy changes during
the 1980s, Gramlich et al. (1993) apply tax and transfer policies of 1980 and 1985 to
the pre—tax income distribution of 1990. They report that 16 percent of the increase
in the Gini coeﬃcient from 1980 to 1990 are due to changes in taxes and transfers,
although the exact scope of their study in terms of simulated taxes and transfers is
not clear. More recently, Poterba (2007) conducts conceptually similar policy swaps
by applying 2004 eﬀective tax rates to the 2000 pre—tax income distribution and vice
versa and examines the resulting eﬀects on the share of post—tax (but before payroll
tax) income accruing to various income groups. A key ﬁnding from this analysis is that
the impact of changes in the pre—tax income distribution is approximately four times
as large as the policy eﬀect of changes in eﬀective tax rates.12
3 Methodology
3.1 Decomposition
We follow the decomposition approach by Bargain and Callan (2010). Consider a
data matrix y containing information on individuals’ pre—tax income from diﬀerent
sources as well as various individual and household characteristics which are relevant
for the calculation of income and payroll taxes. The tax function d represents the
rules and structure of the tax system (e.g., marginal tax and contribution rates) while
vector p accounts for all the monetary parameters (e.g., tax band limits). In this way,
the distribution of post—tax income is represented by di(pj,yl) for tax rules of year i,
tax parameters of year j and nominal incomes of year l. We shall also consider the
possibility of nominally adjusting income levels and/or parameters p by an uprating
factor α. For instance, the counterfactual situation dt+1(pt+1,αt+1yt) represents post—
tax incomes obtained by applying tax rules and parameters of year t+1 on year t data
nominally adjusted to year t+1. This backdrop, where the new policy is evaluated while
holding the population constant, is used in the decomposition below. Symmetrically,
we may evaluate the distribution obtained with the initial policy applied to the new
population. For this, we need to construct a counterfactual dt(αt+1pt,yt+1) where tax
12Further studies examining the degree of redistribution of the U.S. income tax system by means of
policy swaps are Kasten et al. (1994), Mitrusi and Poterba (2000), Alm et al. (2005), Leigh (2008) and
Meyer (2010). However, these studies do not quantify how much of an observed change in post—tax
income inequality is due to policy changes. Instead, the focus of these contributions is on the changing
importance of income and payroll taxes over time (Mitrusi and Poterba 2000), on the progressivity of
the income tax (Kasten et al. 1994 and Alm et al. 2005), the redistributiveness of state taxes (Leigh
2008) and the distributional eﬀect of the EITC reform enacted through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Meyer 2010).
5parameters are uprated using the same factor αt+1 as used to scale up the distribution
of gross income between period t and t+1.13 As further explained below, policy changes
under study possibly combine changes in policy structure d and changes in parameters
p (the ‘uprating policy’).





of the simulated distribution of post—tax income. The advan-
tage of the present approach is that we may use any inequality measure and not only
those with speciﬁc properties (i.e., decomposable indices). In general, it is possible
to decompose any scalar I, e.g. average and eﬀective marginal tax rates, measures
of tax redistribution or automatic stabilization. Characterize total change ∆I in the














and notice that the last term can also be written I[dt(αt+1pt,αt+1yt)] since function
d is linearly homogenous in p and y.14 Then, the total change between periods t and
t+1 can be decomposed into the contributions of changing policy and of changing data
(i.e., changing the underlying gross income distribution due to all eﬀects not directly
due to tax reforms). The policy eﬀect can be assessed on end period data yt+1, and in




















Notice that in this case, base period tax parameters are applied to end period data
yt+1 after nominal adjustment, i.e., writing parameters as αt+1pt. Symmetrically, the
decomposition can be written as a policy eﬀect assessed on base year data followed by
a change in underlying data conditional on the new policy. This decomposition II is
thus written as:
13A measure dt(pt,yt+1) would not be consistent since base-period parameters would be artiﬁcially
applied to end-period income levels. For instance, previous tax band thresholds would be applied
to new and possibly higher income levels, thereby generating artiﬁcial ‘ﬁscal drag’ (see Saez 2003 or
Immervoll 2005).
14Converting tax parameters and income from dollars into euros does not change the relative




















In this case, the end—period tax system is evaluated on nominally—adjusted base—period
data αt+1yt.
As the decompositions are path dependent, we simply average policy and other ef-
fects respectively over the decompositions I and II. Doing so corresponds to the sugges-
tion of Shorrocks (1999) of using a Shapley value procedure whereby the contribution
of a given factor (to a change in the statistic I) is obtained by extracting the marginal
contribution of eliminating this factor and averaging these marginal contributions over
all possible elimination sequences. In the empirical sections, however, we shall verify
that results based on decompositions I and II are not too diﬀerent to each other and
to the average Shapley decomposition result.
In the decompositions, it is important to understand that the nominally—adjusted
tax schedule, αt+1pt, is not identical to the actual set of parameters pt+1 as decided by
the policy—maker. Hence, the policy eﬀect does not only capture the eﬀect of changes
in policy structure (dt to dt+1) on the income distribution but also the actual uprating
policy (shift from pt to pt+1) against a scenario where parameters are adjusted in line
with the uprating factor αt+1. The way tax brackets are uprated by governments can
have important implications for the income distribution and public spending in the
long run. Standard practice consists in one of the three following options: (1) no
uprating, (2) uprating according to the level of price inﬂation, (3) uprating according
to the level of earnings growth. With non—indexation of tax brackets in progressive
systems, or price indexation when incomes rise faster than prices, the total number
of tax payers (and the number of higher—rate taxpayers) increases. This phenomenon
of ‘ﬁscal drag’ or ‘bracket creep’ must aﬀect the ﬁnal distribution of post—tax income
(see Saez 2003 and Immervoll 2005). In our empirical application, we use changes
in the consumer price index. This reference situation is extensively used in policy
analyses of tax reforms (cf., discussion in Clark and Leicester 2004). This choice
is also justiﬁed on historical ground as it aims to guarantee some continuity in the
evaluation of policies (see Sutherland et al. 2008). In a robustness check (see section
4.3), we rely on a more conservative approach based on nominal wage growth, i.e., a
distributionally—neutral backdrop (cf. Bargain and Callan 2010). A related issue is
the question whether it is interesting to further decompose our policy eﬀect into the
contributions of structural changes and uprating policy, respectively. For some types
of reforms, these two components are usually intertwined in a way that makes the
7distinction irrelevant and arbitrary. For instance, a change in the maximum amount of
EITC, other monetary parameters being held constant, also entails a necessary change
in the phase—in and phase—out rates. Classifying the former as uprating policy change
and the latter as “structural” policy change is probably meaningless. However, in
the empirical results, we should pay attention to periods where uprating policies were
subject to speciﬁc changes, typically price—indexation policies during high inﬂation
periods.
With the present approach, we are able to account for direct eﬀects of tax policy
changes but don’t consider the indirect response to changes in tax policy (Poterba
(2007), p. 632—633, Slemrod (1992), p. 108).15 For instance, reforms may aﬀect labor
supply behavior and hence the distribution of gross income. In particular, the EITC
reforms have been shown to change substantially participation rates among married
couples and single mothers (cf., Eissa and Hoynes (2006), among others). In addition
to adjustments in participation or work hours, tax reforms may aﬀect many diﬀerent
other margins (e.g., tax evasion) and change the tax base at all levels and in particular
at the top of the distribution. This point is investigated in the new tax responsiveness
literature (Feldstein 1995, Gruber and Saez 2002 and Saez et al. 2011). Hence, further
research may account for this indirect eﬀect, which could be handled in the present
decomposition framework. However, as we look at year—to—year changes, the “other
eﬀect” should more or less equal the indirect, behavioral eﬀect as other, structural
changes are unlikely to occur in the short—run.
3.2 Data
Several data sources have been used in studies focusing on the impact of taxation
on income inequality, in particular tax return data (e.g. Piketty and Saez 2007) and
household surveys such as the CPS (e.g. Alm et al. 2005). It is well—known that there
are pros and cons for both types of data sources (Poterba 2007). In brief, tax return
data allow to precisely calculate top income shares, but do not contain information
about non—ﬁling households (typically at the bottom of the distribution) and lack
certain (tax—relevant) components of household income. The CPS is a rich micro—
data set of U.S. households and a primary data source for investigating income and
distribution trends. It is also the source for oﬃcial U.S. government statistics on
(un)employment and poverty. However, it does not contain information with respect
to itemized deductions which might aﬀect our results. Further, for conﬁdentiality
reasons, the U.S. Census Bureau “top codes” (i.e. censors) all income sources, with
diﬀerences in methods between some years. This can cause a downward bias of income
15Piketty and Saez (2007), p.9, however, argue that given the controversy about behavioral re-
sponses to taxation "[...] considering the basic case with no behavioral response is a useful starting
place".
8inequality estimates.
In this study, we use data from IPUMS—CPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Se-
ries, Current Population Survey) which is a harmonized set of data of the Annual Social
and Economic ‘March’ Supplement (ASEC) comprising the years 1962—2010. The CPS
is a monthly U.S. household survey representative of the civilian non—institutional
population and jointly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Importantly, we are able to overcome the shortcomings associated with this
data source. First, to alleviate the problem of topcoding, we use an extended series of
cell means constructed from internal CPS (see Larrimore et al. 2008 and Burkhauser
et al. 2010) which enables us to closely replicate inequality trends found in the inter-
nal CPS data.16 Further, we focus our analysis on percentile ratios such as the 90/10
ratio which is standard in the U.S. income inequality literature (see e.g. Gottschalk
and Danziger 2005, Meyer and Sullivan 2010). Second, for the imputation of itemized
deductions we use data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These are represen-
tative micro—level tax return ﬁles compiled annually by the Statistics of Income (SOI)
division of the IRS. In a sensitivity check, we explore how our results are aﬀected by
this imputation (see section 4.3).
3.3 Sample selection, income concepts and the calculation of
counterfactual scenarios
Our sample solely includes non—elderly households meaning that at least one member
of the household is in working—age, i.e. between the ages of 15 and 64. The motivation
for this sample selection is driven by the fact that our analysis entirely focuses on tax—
policy and does not consider the policy eﬀect of transfers targeted to the elderly. In a
robustness check, we recalculate our results for the full population. We use the square
root of household size as equivalence factor in order to account for economies of scale
within households (see e.g. Atkinson et al. 1995 or Burkhauser et al. 2009).
Throughout this paper, we focus on pre— and post—tax income inequality which are
deﬁned as commonly done in the literature (e.g., Heathcote et al. 2010 and Meyer and
Sullivan 2010). Pre—tax income is taken from the data and follows the Census deﬁnition
of money income that is used to measure poverty and inequality. It is computed as
the sum of market income (sum of pre-tax wage and salary income, business and
farm income, interest, investment, and rental income) plus private (e.g. alimony) and
public transfers (e.g. unemployment beneﬁts, Social Security, SSI, welfare payments).
Post—tax income is deﬁned as pre—tax income minus the simulated components of the
income tax system including federal income taxes, state income taxes, employee social
16Note that even internal CPS data is censored. However, Burkhauser et al. (2011a) show that
with internal CPS data, it is possible to match top income shares reported by Piketty and Saez (2003)
who use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return data.
9insurance contributions (payroll taxes), and tax credits (e.g. EITC).
For the calculation of the baseline as well as for counterfactual scenarios and the
isolation of the tax policy eﬀect — i.e. applying policy parameters from the base pe-
riod to the population of the end period or policy parameters from the end period
to the population of the base period — we use NBER’s simulation model TAXSIM.17
The simulation approach allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the
parameters of interest while holding everything else constant which avoids endogene-
ity problems when identifying the eﬀects of the policy reform under consideration (cf.
Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006). When assessing the isolated role of tax policy on
income inequality, we are thus able to account for changes in federal and state level
income taxes as well as payroll taxes and tax credits such as the EITC. Our analysis
spans the period 1978 until 2009.
3.4 Tax history
In this section, we brieﬂy outline the major changes in the U.S. federal income tax
system from 1978 until 2009 which are also summarized in Table 1. We concentrate on
large legislative changes which drive the tax policy eﬀect described later in this section.
Reforms of interest are the Revenue Act of 1978 (RA78), the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93), the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001 (EGTRRA01), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
(JGTRRA03) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA09).
The aim of RA78 was to enhance real GDP growth (Romer and Romer 2009).
For that purpose, by widening tax brackets and reducing the number of tax rates,
individual taxes were reduced. Further, at that time inﬂation was relatively high and
individual income tax parameters were not ﬁxed for inﬂation so that “bracket creep”
led to increases in income tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. RA78 to some extent
attenuated this eﬀect and caused a yearly reduction in tax revenue of on average 0.83
percent of GDP in the four years after the reform (c.f. Tempalski (2006) for estimates
of revenue eﬀects mentioned in this section).
ERTA81 introduced the indexation of individual income tax parameters which be-
came eﬀective in 1985. Tax cuts were phased in over the years 1982—1984, with a
reduction of top marginal tax rates from 70 to 50 percent in 1982 and of other tax
rates by 23 percent in three annual steps. Further, the income threshold for the top
rate substantially increased from $85,600 in 1982 to $109,400 (1983) and $162,400
(1984) for married couples ﬁling jointly. Similar threshold increases occurred for cou-
17For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) or visit
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
10ples ﬁling separately and singles. The reduction in tax revenue amounting to 2.89
percent of GDP (four year average) was substantially larger than for RA78.
The motivation of TRA86 was to make the tax system simpler and more conducive
to long—run growth (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997 and Romer and Romer 2009). Key
aspects of the reform were the broadening of the tax base and reductions in marginal tax
rates. Consequently, the reform was almost revenue neutral. TRA86 further lowered
the top marginal rate to 38.5 percent in 1987 and to 28 percent in 1988, reduced the
number of tax brackets from 15 in 1986 to four in 1988, but also substantially expanded
the EITC with ﬁnancial beneﬁts for low—income households.
Reforms in the 1990s which had considerable direct policy eﬀects are OBRA90,
OBRA93 and TRA97. OBRA90 contained increases in income taxes as well as expan-
sions of the EITC and other low—income credits. Further, payroll taxes were increased
by lifting the taxable maximum for Hospital Insurance which were ﬁnally abolished in
1994. OBRA93 then led to the largest single expansion of the EITC (cf. Eissa and
Hoynes 2011), and further increases in income tax rates were implemented, e.g. the
top rate rose from 31 to 39.6 percent in 1993. The EITC became much more gener-
ous in 1994 with higher maximum credits and an expansion to single workers with no
children. These EITC expansions continued in the next years. The revenue eﬀect of
OBRA90 and OBRA93 was — again evaluated on a four year average — positive and
amounted to 0.5 and 0.63 percent of GDP, respectively. TRA97 lowered capital gains
tax rates and introduced additional tax credits (child and education tax credits).
EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 were characterized by reductions in marginal tax
rates, both for low— and high—income families, expansions of the child tax credits, and
reductions in taxes on dividends. In 2003, JGTRRA accelerated those provisions of
EGTRRA which were not set to become eﬀective until 2006. Both reforms had a
revenue—decreasing eﬀect (—0.71 and —0.57 percent of GDP, 4 year average).
Finally, ARRA09 was a countercyclical ﬁscal stimulus program in response to the
severe economic contraction in 2008/2009. It contained, among other measures, in-
dividual tax cuts and adjustments of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) which,
together with some business tax incentives, accounted for $263.3 billion of the total
$787 billion program at the end of December 2009 (see e.g. Council of Economic Ad-
visors 2010a). Important tax measures were the creation of the Making Work Pay
Credit, a refundable tax credit of up to $400 for working individuals and up to $800
for married taxpayers ﬁling jointly, the American Opportunity Tax Credit, EITC ex-
pansions and an extension of the AMT relief to 2009 as well as an increase in the AMT
tax exemption (Council of Economic Advisors 2010b, Tax Policy Center 2011).
114 Results
4.1 Trends in average tax rates and income inequality
Before we turn to the decomposition analysis, we ﬁrst describe the general trend in
average tax rates and income inequality during the observation period. For the cal-
culation of average tax rates, we group households by quintiles of market income and
calculate the share of income paid in federal and state level income taxes.18 We ac-
count for tax expenditure on the federal and state level. Results are reported in Figure
1. Compared with the average tax rates for households at the top and the bottom
of the income distribution, those for the second to fourth income quintile show less
variation and are combined in one series. The average tax rate for the highest quintile
decreased from a peak in 1981 (almost 30 percent) until reaching the trough in 1990
(23 percent). It constantly increased in the 1990s reaching again the 30 percent level
in 2000 before it started to fall in the following years. Contrary, the average tax rate
for households in the lowest income quintile was almost constant until 1990 and turned
negative afterwards. It decreased dramatically in the period from 1990 to 1996 due
to expansions of the EITC. After a slight increase in the second half of the 1990s, it
fell again after 2000. Marked changes in average tax rates occured especially during
the Great Recession period of 2008/2009. While the average tax rate for the lowest
quintile increased sharply in 2008, the drop in 2009 was even larger. The increase in
2008 was due to the substantial decline in market income of households at the bottom
of the distribution (see also Figure 2) which was caused by an unprecedented rise in the
unemployment rate. In fact, this trend continued in 2009 with the unemployment rate
reaching a peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009 (U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2010), but at the same time, discretionary policy measures enacted
through ARRA09 (cf. section 3.4 and Table 1) became eﬀective and led to a sharp
decline in tax liabilities, particularly for low income households (Council of Economic
Advisors 2010b).
Income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically over the past 30
years. For instance, for households headed by working—age individuals, market incomes
in the upper part of the distribution show an upwards trend in almost all periods since
1978, while they increased remarkably little in the middle and show large and sustained
declines at the bottom during and after recessions (cf. Figure 2). This is particularly
true for the recent economic crisis.
The following analysis is essentially based on three percentile ratios which capture
diﬀerent parts of the income distribution (90/10, 90/50 and 50/10) and spans the
period from 1978 to 2009. Importantly, we now focus on pre— and post—tax income
18Cf. Piketty and Saez (2007) who also rank families by market income, but focus on federal taxes.
Contrary, estimates for average tax rates of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2010) are based on
comprehensive household income including cash transfers and in-kind beneﬁts.
12instead of on market income (cf. section 3.3). We ﬁrst describe the overall trend in
pre—tax inequality. Figure 3 reports the percentile ratios at each point in time while
Figures 4—7 show the absolute change relative to the starting year 1978 (black dots).
The 90/10 ratio for household pre—tax incomes increases by roughly 3.2 points (from
6.1 to 9.3, or by 52 percent) over the period as a whole. The upper and lower half of the
distribution equally contribute to this increase. In line with other studies on inequality
trends, the increase was particularly steep until the early—mid 1990s (see section 2).
The gap between the 90th and the 10th percentiles then dropped until 2000 before
rising again at a reduced pace in the years before the Great Recession and accelerating
during the 2008-2009 period (cf. Burkhauser and Larrimore 2011).
Post—tax inequality series closely follow the pre—tax series, but with some diﬀerences
between the three ratios as is illustrated in Figures 4—7. The dark triangles show the
diﬀerence between the series for pre— and post tax inequality (i.e. the line “measured
redistribution” gives the diﬀerential between pre—tax inequality in period t relative to
its base year value in 1978 and post—tax inequality in t relative to the base year).
Although there are some ﬂuctuations, the overall picture is one of a rather constant
(in case of 90/10 and 50/10 ratio) or slightly decreasing (90/50) diﬀerence in pre—
and post—tax inequality in the 1980s. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, the
diﬀerence started to increase for all three measures until reaching a peak in the late
1990s (90/10 and 50/10 ratio) or the early 2000s (90/50 ratio). After a slight reduction,
all three series remained constant until the mid 2000s. This development is in line with
previous research, see e.g. Heathcote et al. (2010) who report similar trends for the
Gini coeﬃcient. During the Great Recession period, post—tax inequality increased
signiﬁcantly in 2008, whereas part of this increase was reversed in 2009 due to the tax
cuts enacted through ARRA09.
The fact that the diﬀerence between pre— and post—tax income inequality largely
remained constant during the 1980s and became larger in certain periods (in particular
during 1989—1994 for the 90/10 and 50/10 ratio and until the early 2000s for the
90/50) shows that the overall redistributive capacity of the U.S. income tax system
signiﬁcantly rose during these periods (see e.g. Heathcote et al. 2010). However, it can
be suspected that this increased redistributive eﬀect was driven by the very pronounced
increase in pre—tax inequality over time. Clearly, actual policy eﬀects and the indirect
role of pre—tax income changes cannot be disentangled with a simple comparison of pre—
and post—tax inequality. As explained in our methodology section, the decomposition
analysis that follows allows us to separate both eﬀects by controlling for the underlying
pre—tax income distribution.
134.2 Decomposition results
We ﬁrst illustrate the decomposition procedure with Tables 2—4. In each of these tables,
we compare two years, i.e., before and after important legislation changes have been
enacted (base and end year). We decompose the total change in post—tax inequality
into two components. The ﬁrst is due to tax policy reforms (tax policy eﬀect) while
the second is due to changes in the underlying data (“other” eﬀect). Precisely, the
latter eﬀect accounts for changes in the distribution of market income (labor or capi-
tal income), in the population (participation rates, household structure which aﬀects
equivalence scales) and in replacement incomes which are included in pre—tax income
(e.g. unemployment beneﬁts or welfare payments). For instance, Table 2 analyzes
changes in inequality which occurred between the base year 1978 — the year when the
RA78 reform was enacted — and year 1980 when it was fully phased—in. The left part of
the table reports the diﬀerent components of the decomposition as detailed in section 3,
including base and end period scenarios ((0)/(1) and (4) respectively) as well as all the
relevant counterfactuals (scenario (2) answers the question how large inequality would
have been, had the tax system of 1978 been in place in 1980; (3) is the counterfactual
scenario of the 1980 tax system being in place in 1978). The column labeled “(4)—(0)”
shows the total change in inequality over time. The right part of the Table reports both
the policy and “other” eﬀect for decompositions I, II and the Shapley—value approach.
The other eﬀect. To understand the decomposition results, we start with the
“other” eﬀect which is shown in the last column of Tables 2—4 for the Shapley—value
decomposition. A substantial part of the increase in post—tax income inequality which
can be observed in those periods during which the large tax reforms were phased—in
was due to changes in the pre—tax income distribution. For example, the 90/10 ratio
would have increased by 0.28 points from 1978 to 1980 if no tax policy change had oc-
curred (cf. Table 2 for the years 1978—1980). The sign of the inequality change due to
the other eﬀect is also positive for the reform periods 1981—1984 and 1986—1988. This
partly captures income shifting from the corporate to the individual sector, especially
after TRA86 (see e.g. Feenberg and Poterba 1993 and Slemrod 1996). The other eﬀect
is even more pronounced for some of the following reform periods, especially for the
period from 1989 to 1994 which was characterized by a steep increase in inequality (see
last section). In this period, the 90/10 ratio of post—tax income would have increased
by 0.54 points — a larger eﬀect as was actually observed (cf. Table 4 for the period
1989—1994) — in the absence of any changes in tax policy.
The direct policy eﬀect. Following a chronological order, we start with RA78 to
assess the eﬀect of legislative changes in tax policy on post—tax income inequality.
As can be seen from the Shapley—value policy eﬀect, RA78 counteracted the trend of
14growing inequality. However, the inequality—decreasing eﬀect of tax policy was not
large enough to oﬀset the overall trend of growing inequality. The tax policy eﬀect
led to a reduction in all inequality measures considered in our analysis. Results for
decompositions I and II yield almost identical eﬀects.19
A diﬀerent picture emerges for the two large tax reforms in the 1980s. The eﬀect of
ERTA81 was to exacerbate the trend of growing inequality over the years 1981—1984,
with 35—50 percent of the increase in post—tax inequality — depending on the chosen
inequality measure — due to the reform (i.e. the tax—policy eﬀect divided by the total
change in post—tax inequality).
Contrary to ERTA81, TRA86 certainly contained both inequality—increasing (re-
duction in top marginal tax rates) and —decreasing elements (expansion of EITC, tax
base broadening). This can be seen in the last two columns of Table 3 (1986—1988).
The policy eﬀect of TRA86 led to a slight decrease (increase) in inequality at the
bottom (top) of the distribution (50/10 and 90/50 ratio). Interestingly, the inequality—
increasing eﬀect of TRA86 on the Gini coeﬃcient as well as the 90/10 and 90/50 ratios
was even larger than the increase due to changes in the pre—tax income distribution.
The contribution of tax policy to the growing post—tax inequality ranges between 67—76
percent for this period.
The period in the early 1990s was then characterized by steep increases in pre— and
post—tax income inequality. OBRA90 and OBRA93 counteracted — at least to some
extent — the rapidly growing inequality at that time. Comparing the years 1989 and
1994, i.e. the year before OBRA90 was enacted with the year when OBRA93 was
eﬀective (cf. Table 4, 1989—1994), one can conclude that the overall eﬀect of these
reforms was inequality—decreasing, especially in the lower half of the distribution due
to large expansions of the EITC. The tax policy eﬀect worked in the opposite direction
as changes in the pre—tax income distribution and made up 75 percent of the other
eﬀect for the lower part of the distribution, whereas it was negligible for the upper part
of the distribution.
Finally, we showin the lower part of Table 4 (2000—2004) that the eﬀect of EGTRRA01
and JGTRRA03 was to increase inequality, in particular in the middle and at the top of
the distribution through reductions in marginal tax rates. However, overall the policy
eﬀect was moderate compared with the increase in inequality due to changes in the
pre—tax income distribution and accounted for up to 22.2 percent of the total increase
in post—tax inequality. An overall assessment of the policy eﬀect of ARRA09 is not
possible yet as its measures extend to 2010 for which no data are available at the time
of writing of this paper. However, its impact on average tax rates is discussed in the
19The comparison of columns (4) and (2) of Table 2 (1978-1980) reveals that, without RA78,
inequality in 1980 would have been higher as it actually was in that year. The second counterfactual
reported in this table is shown in column (3). If the tax system of 1980 had been in place in 1978,
inequality would have been lower compared with the observed inequality in 1978 (compare columns
(3) and (1)).
15following section.
Policy eﬀect on average tax rates. Average tax rates are inﬂuenced by changes
in tax policy and the distribution of pre—tax income in the same way as the inequality
measures discussed above. Hence, we isolate the policy eﬀect and report the (cumu-
lative) hypothetical change in average tax rates (in percentage points) if the pre—tax
income distribution would have remained constant during the whole observation period
in Figure 9. Strikingly, in the 1980s the policy eﬀect on average tax rates was strongest
for households in the highest income quintile. Taken together, ERTA81 and TRA86
(time period 1981-1988) reduced average tax rates by 10 percentage points for the ﬁfth
quintile, by 6 percentage points for the fourth quintile, by 4 percentage points for the
third quintile, but only by 1 (3) points for the second (ﬁrst) quintile. The EITC reforms
starting with OBRA90 and OBRA93 led to considerable reductions in average tax rates
for low income households while tax reforms in the early 2000s further reduced average
tax rates at the top of the distribution. Tax changes implemented through ARRA09,
e.g. extensions of existing tax credits (EITC) and the implementation of new credits
(Making Work Pay Credit), further reduced average tax rates, in particular at the
bottom of the distribution.
Year—to—year analysis. We have replicated the decomposition analysis for all years
in the data and report the results in Figures 10—13. In these graphs, policy and “other”
eﬀects are presented as percent of post—tax income inequality of the previous year. The
total eﬀect, which is simply the sum of both eﬀects, is the percentage change between
two consecutive years. Conﬁrming the results presented above for speciﬁc policy events,
these graphs demonstrate that the policy eﬀect was usually smaller than the other eﬀect
in years where policy reforms occurred (and obviously zero in years with no or minor
changes in the tax schedule). In certain periods, tax policies actually aggravated the
increase in pre—tax income inequality, while they were more “countercyclical” in other
times. The former was particularly true for the 1980s when the tax cuts of ERTA81
and TRA86 became eﬀective (the policy eﬀect actually outweighed the “other” eﬀect in
1983 for 90/10 and 90/50 and in 1987 for 90/10). This was also the case, for the 90/10
and 50/10 ratios, in some of the years after 1993 when pre—tax income inequality went
down and tax—policy enforced this trend. The latter — an inequality—reducing eﬀect
— was pronounced in the late 1970s (RA78), in the period 1990—1993 (OBRA90 and
OBRA93), mainly due to expansions of the EITC, as well as in 2009 (ARRA09).
Figure 14 extracts the policy eﬀect (again relative to the inequality measure of the
previous year) for all three percentile ratios. It conﬁrms that the diﬀerent parts of
the distribution were aﬀected simultaneously, with some exceptions. In particular, the
90/50 ratio showed very little response to the policy changes in the 1990s. This reﬂects
the fact that EITC extensions concerned more the lower incomes.
16Comparison to the literature. There is no comparable study which covers such a
long time period in a consistent framework as we do. Previous research has been partial
in the sense that it focused on one policy event or a much shorter time period. Gramlich
et al. (1993) and Poterba (2007) who discuss the relative size of the policy eﬀect relative
to the changes in the pre—tax income distribution, are the studies closest to ours. First,
it must be stressed that a comparison with these studies has to be handled with some
caution given the diﬀerences with respect to simulated policies, inequality measures,
income concepts and data used. Nevertheless, the policy analyst might gain some
insight about the quantitative impact of tax policy on income inequality. Gramlich
et al. (1993) ﬁnd that 16 percent of the increase in the Gini—coeﬃcient in the 1980s
was due to changes in policies, yet it seems these authors account for a broader policy
eﬀect that includes transfers.20 When focusing on changes in the tax system only, we
ﬁnd a contribution of the policy eﬀect of 37 percent to the total change in the Gini.21
This implies that changes in transfer policies to some extent counteracted the increase
in inequality in that period. Similarly, Poterba (2007) calculates counterfactuals for the
years 2000 and 2004. While focusing on top incomes, the author also reports changes
for diﬀerent quintiles. Poterba (2007) concludes that policy changes had a very minor
eﬀect compared to changes in pre—tax income inequality, which is totally in line with
our results (see Table 4).
Comparing eﬀects over time. Finally, we reconsider the questions of — ﬁrst — how
the overall redistributive capacity of the income tax system has changed and — second —
how reforms over the whole period 1978—2009 have aﬀected income inequality in total.
Therefore, we go back to Figures 4, 6 and 7 and focus on measured redistribution (dark
triangles) and the pure policy eﬀect (hollow triangles). For the interpretation of the
pure policy eﬀect in Figures 4, 6 and 7, it is important to note that the hollow trian-
gles in each year t show the cumulative policy eﬀect from starting year 1978 to year
t. As discussed in the introduction and shown in many contributions since Musgrave
and Thin (1948), in a progressive tax system, one would expect a co—movement of
tax redistribution (dark triangles) and income inequality before taxes. In other words,
given no changes in the tax system between two periods, a progressive tax system
cushions changes in pre—tax inequality such that the change in post—tax inequality is
less pronounced.22 In Figure 4, such a link is indeed apparent during periods when in-
20Gramlich et al. (1993) argue that with policy parameters of 1980 still in place in 1990, the post-
tax Gini in 1990 would have increased by only 0.057 points instead of by 0.068 points as it actually
did, i.e. the policy change accounted for 16 percent of the Gini increase.
21Following the same line of arguing as Gramlich et al. (1993), we ﬁnd that with tax policy para-
meters of 1980 still in place in 1990, the Gini coeﬃcient would have increased by 0.0303 points instead
of the observed rise by 0.0481 points. Thus, according to our calculations, 63 percent of the increase
were due to changes in the pre-tax income distribution and 37 percent due to tax policy.
22This property of a progressive tax system is also known as automatic stabilization (see, e.g.,
Auerbach and Feenberg 2000 or Dolls et al. 2010). Contrary, with a regressive system the change in
17come gaps widened rapidly (1980—1982, 1989—1993 and 2009) or narrowed (late 1990s).
Importantly, a comparison with the pure policy eﬀect conveys that this “automatic”
increase in redistribution has been the main (and sometimes the only) reason for the
tax system to slow down the growth in post—tax inequality. Policy changes imple-
mented in 1982, 1987 and the early 2000s were disequalizing, while the reforms of the
late 1970s, early 1990s and 2009 made income taxes more redistributive. Over the
time period as a whole, these direct eﬀects of policy changes more or less canceled
out. The results for the upper and lower parts of the distribution (Fig. 6 and 7) show
that the equalizing eﬀect of policy in the early—to—mid 1990s was a result of changes
that improved the situation of low—income earners, notably the increased generosity of
the EITC. By contrast, from 1982—1988, policy conﬁgurations exacerbated the income
gaps in the upper part of the distribution (between the 90th and the 50th percentile),
had the population and pre—tax distribution remained unchanged. The (only) reason
why the tax system nevertheless compensated some of the growing pre—tax income
disparities in the upper income segment is that the built—in progressivity made the tax
system more redistributive as income inequalities grew — and this eﬀect was stronger
than the weakening of the redistributive eﬀect produced by policy reforms.
Given the data quality issues discussed in section 3, there are good reasons for
basing an analysis of longer—term trends on inequality measures that are not unduly
inﬂuenced by measurement errors at the top (or the bottom) of the distribution. It is
nevertheless interesting to compare the results of the decomposition of inter—quintile
ratios, such as the P90/P10, with more comprehensive global inequality measures, such
as the Gini coeﬃcient. Figure 8 shows that the overall patterns are the same: a large
increase in pre—tax income inequality, increased redistribution which compensates some
of this disequalizing eﬀect, and little contribution of policy changes over the period as
a whole. The important diﬀerence, however, is that taxes on incomes were much less
able to counter the increase in pre—tax inequality (both the policy eﬀect and the total
change in redistribution are close to zero and inequality therefore grew by about the
same extent whether measured in pre— or in post—tax terms). The Gini coeﬃcient
measures income diﬀerentials in all parts of the distribution and, compared to the
P90/P10 ratio, gives (much) more weight to income disparities in the middle. The fact
that redistribution as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient compensated for only about
10 percent of the increase in pre—tax inequality suggests that the tax system is less
eﬀective at countering changes in the middle (e.g., due to a “hollowing out” of the
middle classes), than at either end of the distribution.
Political cycles and inequality changes. We have seen that tax policy indeed
had an inequality—increasing eﬀect in the 1980s and early 2000s and an inequality—
post—tax inequality would be larger, whereas changes in pre— and post—tax inequality would be equal
with a proportional system.
18decreasing eﬀect in the early 1990s and in 2009. These sub-periods can be broadly
classiﬁed by Republican and Democrat administrations. Our counterfactual simula-
tions also show that during Republican administrations average tax rates fell strongest
for high income, but very little for low income households (Figure 9). This paper there-
fore complements analyses conducted by Bartels (2008) as the decomposition analysis
enables us to control for changes in the pre—tax income distribution and hence to single
out the pure policy eﬀect. Bartels (2008) ﬁnds that under Democratic presidents real
incomes grew much faster at the bottom and in the middle of the income distribution
compared to Republican Administrations. He further shows that income growth was
also much more equally distributed under Democratic presidents than under Repub-
licans, where incomes of the rich increased by far the most. These ﬁndings are also
visible in Figures 2—8 where increases in inequality by and large coincide with Republi-
can presidents. This conﬁrms the view by Krugman (2005) that partisan politics have
a major impact on the income distribution. This is true not only for pre—tax but also
for post—tax incomes.
4.3 Robustness checks
Choice of the uprating factor. An interesting question is to what extent our results
depend on the choice of the uprating factor. As a sensitivity check, we replicate the
analysis for the period 1986—1988 with mean nominal wage growth as uprating factor.23
The period after TRA86 is appropriate for a robustness check for two reasons. First, the
growth rates of mean nominal wages from 1986 to 1988 exceeded those of the CPI by 74
and 21 percent (6.38 vs. 3.66 percent and 4.93 vs. 4.08 percent), respectively. This was
one of the largest diﬀerences between the two indices in the observation period which
makes the choice of the uprating factor a critical decision. Second, income brackets
were adjusted due to changes in tax rates, but not due to indexation. From 1986 to
1987 (1987 to 1988), the number of tax brackets fell from 15 to 5 (5 to 4), see Table 1.
Results do not change much with nominal wage indexation as can be seen in Table
3 (lower part). The policy eﬀect is slightly smaller for the Gini and P90/P10 and
identical for the other two percentile ratios. Because of the larger growth rates, ’ﬁscal
drag’ in the counterfactual scenarios (2) and (3) is stronger for wage than for price
indexation as the propensity that taxpayers near the top—end of a tax bracket move
in the upper bracket is higher. Hence, the inequality—increasing eﬀect of TRA86 is
marginally cushioned when uprating with wage growth.
23We choose the National Average Wage Index according to which the taxable maximum for So-
cial Security is automatically adjusted. See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/AWI.html for further
information.
19Itemized deductions. As the CPS lacks information with regard to itemized de-
ductions, we impute them from tax return data compiled by the Statistics of Income
(SOI) division of the IRS. The imputation procedure is based on Alm et al. (2005) and
consists of two steps. First, we calculate for each year and income group the share of
taxpayers who itemize by building 14 income groups in the SOI data based on adjusted
gross income (AGI). We follow Alm et al. (2005) and assume that there are no itemiz-
ers with incomes below $10,000. Corresponding income groups are constructed in the
CPS and taxpayers are randomly drawn such that the shares of itemizers per income
group match between SOI and CPS data. Second, the amount of itemized deductions
is imputed by calculating itemized deductions as a share of federal AGI in the SOI
data and by multiplying this share with the federal AGI of those who itemize in the
CPS. With this adjustment, we rerun all our calculations.
An important result of this sensitivity check is that post—tax inequality slightly
increases. The reason is that the share of itemizers increases by income group, i.e. it
is more likely for taxpayers with high incomes to have itemized deductions exceeding
the standard deduction. As a consequence, the measured redistribution mechanically
decreases as can be seen in Figure 5.24 The tax policy eﬀect for speciﬁc reform periods,
however, changes only marginally (if at all) when itemized deductions are imputed. An
exception is the period 1986—1988 in which the share of itemizers decreased. This was
due to TRA86 which led to an increase of the standard deduction and a cut of certain
itemized deductions (see Table 1 and Auten et al. 1992) limiting to some extent the
inequality—increasing eﬀect of TRA86.
Income concept. Our measure of pre—tax income includes government transfers, e.g.
income from welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC / Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, TANF), unemployment beneﬁts as well as Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI). Alternatively, we have calculated a variant which excludes
transfers from the pre—tax income measure. In this variant, pre—tax income is equal
to market income which leads to an increase in pre—tax inequality as well as measured
redistribution. The reason is that in this case the diﬀerence between pre— and post—tax
income includes taxes and transfers. The tax policy eﬀect, however, is unaﬀected by
the change in the deﬁnition of pre—tax income.25
24We only report results for the P90/P10 ratio due to space restrictions. Results for other inequality
measures as well as shares of itemizers and itemized deductions relative to adjusted gross income per
income group are available from the authors upon request. The series in Figure 5 excludes all years
after 2006 as we do not have access to SOI data for more recent years.
25It would be interesting to conduct additional simulations of diﬀerent transfer policies in order to
single out the joint policy eﬀect of taxes and transfers. However, this would require strong assumptions
mainly with regard to eligibility when conducting policy swaps as there is only limited information in
the CPS data. Therefore, this paper focuses on the redistributive role of tax policy.
20Sample selection. We additionally check if our results are sensitive to the sample
selection and recalculate the analysis for the full CPS sample instead of focusing on
the working-age population. The inequality measures and thus the other eﬀect slightly
deviate from our baseline results, but importantly, the policy eﬀect is hardly aﬀected.26
The robustness checks thus reinforce that our results and, in particular the tax policy
eﬀect, are not sensitive to the choice of the uprating factor, the imputation of itemized
deductions, the income concept and the sample selection.
5 Conclusion
A question of particular policy relevance is to what extent observed changes in income
inequality can be attributed to direct policy action or to other factors that are less
easily inﬂuenced by policy—makers. For any given household, the tax burden has a
direct impact on the resources available for consumption. However, the assessment of
trends in the redistributive properties of tax policies is complicated by the fact that
pre—tax incomes and the population change at the same time as policy parameters.
Since tax burdens depend on both incomes and population characteristics, a given tax
system can become more or less eﬀective at reducing inequalities, even if policy rules
remain unchanged.
In this paper, we have asked how tax policy has aﬀected post—tax income inequality
in the U.S. from 1978 to 2009. For this purpose, we have conducted a set of comprehen-
sive counterfactual simulations by applying — on a yearly basis — tax policy parameters
of a certain base year to the pre—tax income distribution of the end year and vice versa.
The decomposition analysis has enabled us to quantify the direct eﬀect of tax policy
on the post—tax income distribution. A main ﬁnding of this paper is that the measured
redistribution increased over the whole time period, but this was mainly due to the
pronounced increase in pre—tax inequality. The direct eﬀects of policy changes almost
canceled out. Focusing on selected time periods, we ﬁnd that tax policy indeed had an
inequality—increasing eﬀect in the 1980s and early 2000s and an inequality—decreasing
eﬀect in the early 1990s and in 2009. These sub—periods can be broadly classiﬁed by
Republican and Democrat administrations with disequalizing eﬀects observed for the
former and equalizing eﬀects for the latter.
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the direct policy eﬀect and have ne-
glected behavioral responses to tax policy. This is done on purpose in order to isolate
the pure policy eﬀect — the eﬀect which is controlled by the policy—maker. In future
research, it would be interesting to separate the residual eﬀect into the indirect, behav-
ioral policy eﬀect and a population eﬀect. However, we argue that the latter is more
important in the long-run than for the year-to-year analysis that we have conducted
26Results are available from the authors upon request.
21here. Moreover, it would be interesting to further analyze the political economy of
partisan tax politics.
Against the background of a sharp increase in inequality resulting from the Great
Recession and in light of the recently reached budget deal between Democrats and
Republicans, one crucial question is which groups of American society will have to bear
the ﬁscal burden of the budget cuts in the next few years. The tax cuts enacted in the
early 2000s had an inequality-increasing eﬀect (e.g., without the tax reforms of 2001
and 2003, inequality would have increased by a quarter less). Therefore, we argue that
an expiration of the 2001/2003 tax cuts at the end of 2012 would have beneﬁcial eﬀects,
not only due to increased tax revenue and a strengthening of automatic stabilizers —
which are rather weak in the U.S. compared to European countries (Dolls et al. 2010)
— but also with regard to a reduction in inequality.
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27Table 1: Tax Legislation
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Income Tax
Number of tax brackets* 26 16 16 16 13 14
Lowest individual income tax rate** 14%*** 14%*** 14%*** 13.83%*** 12%*** 11%***
Lowest individual income single tax 
bracket
$2,200-$2,700 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400 $2,300-$3,400
Lowest individual income joint tax 
bracket
$3,200-$4200 $3,400-$5500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500 $3,400-$5,500
Other individual income tax brackets 
(percent)*, ****
15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25, 
28, 32, 36, 39, 42, 45, 
48, 50, 53, 55, 58, 60, 
62, 64, 66, 68, 69,
16, 18, 21, 24, 28, 
32 37, 43, 49, 54, 
59, 64, 68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28, 32 
37, 43, 49, 54, 59, 64, 
68
16, 18, 21, 24, 28, 
32 37, 43, 49, 54, 
59, 64, 68
14, 16, 19, 22, 25, 
29, 33, 39, 44, 49
13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 
26, 30, 35, 40, 44, 
48
Highest individual income tax bracket 
rate
70% 70% 70% 70% 50% 50%
Rate on long-term capital gains












Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and 
itemized deductions
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Standard Deduction
$2,200 (single person) 
/ $3,200 (married 
couple)
$2,300 (single 
person) / $3,400 
(married couple)
$2,300 (single person) 
/ $3,400 (married 
couple)
$2,300 (single 
person) / $3,400 
(married couple)
$2,300 (single 
person) / $3,400 
(married couple)
$2,300 (single 
person) / $3,400 
(married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$20,000 for joint and 
single filers
$20,000 for joint 
and single filers
$20,000 for joint and 
single filers
$20,000 for joint 
and single filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
281978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Tax credits
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Child and dependent care tax credit 
(non-refundable)*****
$400 for each of first 2 
dependents, maximum 
20% of expenditures
$400 for each of 
first 2 dependents, 
maximum 20% of 
expenditures
$400 for each of first 
2 dependents, 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 
credit is 20%-30% 
of expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $400 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500 10%, max. $500













Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 10.1% 10.16% 10.16% 10.7% 10.8% 10.8%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 17,700 22,900 25,900 29,700 32,400 35,700
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Income Tax
Number of tax brackets* 15 15 15 5 4 4
Lowest individual income tax rate** 11%*** 11%*** 11%*** 11% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax 
bracket
$2,300-$3,400 $2,390-$3,540 $2,480-$3,670 $0-$1,800 $0-$17,850 $0-$18,550
Lowest individual income joint tax 
bracket
$3,400-$5,500 $3,540-$5,720 $3,670-$5,940 $0-$3,000 $0-$29,750 $0-$30,950
Other individual income tax brackets 
(percent)*, ****
12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 
25, 28, 33, 38, 42, 
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 
25, 28, 33, 38, 42, 
45, 49
12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 
25, 28, 33, 38, 42, 
45, 49
15, 28, 35 28, 33 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket 
rate
50% 50% 50% 38.5% 28% 28%









Ordinary rates Ordinary rates Ordinary rates
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and 
itemized deductions
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Standard Deduction
$2,300 (single 
person) / $3,400 
(married couple)
$2,400 (single 
person) / $3,550 
(married couple)
$2,480 (single 
person) / $3,670 
(married couple)
$2,540 (single 
person) / $3,760 
(married couple)
$3,000 (single 
person) / $5,000 
(married couple)
$3,100 (single person) 
/ $5,200 (married 
couple)
AMT exemption*****
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
291984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Tax credits
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 
credit is 20%-30% 
of expenditures
Maximum expenditure 
eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 
credit is 20%-30% of 
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 10%, max. $500 11%, max. $550 11%, max. $550
14%, max. $851, 
indexed for inflation
14%, max. $874 14%, max. $910















Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 11.4% 12.12% 12.12%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.6% 2.7% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 37,800 39,600 42,000 43,800 45,000 48,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Income Tax
Number of tax brackets* 4 3 3 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax 
bracket
$0-$19,450 $0-$20,350 $0-$21,450 $0-$22,100 $0-$22,750 $0-$23,350
Lowest individual income joint tax 
bracket
$0-$32,450 $0-$34,000 $0-$35,800 $0-$36,900 $0-$38,000 $0-$39,999
Other individual income tax brackets 
(percent)*, ****
28, 33 28 28 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36
Highest individual income tax bracket 
rate
28% 31% 31% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15% 28% and 15%
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and 
itemized deductions
N.A.
Personal exemption phases 
out (PEP) between 
$100,000 and $222,500 
(single), $150,000 and 
$272,500 (joint). Limitation 
on itemized deductions 
(Pease) for AGI over 
$100,000. Thresholds 
indexed for inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed 
for inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed 
for inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation





person) / $5,450 
(married couple)
$3,400 (single person) / 
$5,700 (married couple)
$3,600 (single 
person) / $6,000 
(married couple)
$3,700 (single 
person) / $6,200 
(married couple)
$3,800 (single person) 
/ $6,550 (married 
couple)
$3,900 (single 
person) / $6,550 
(married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single filers, 
$40,000 for joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$30,000 for single 
filers, $40,000 for 
joint filers
$33,750 for single 
filers, $45,000 for 
joint filers
$33,750 for single 
filers, $45,000 for 
joint filers
301990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Tax credits
Child tax credit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, $4,800 
for two or more; 




eligible for credit is $2,400 
for one child, $4,800 for 
two or more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, $4,800 
for two or more; 





for credit is $2,400 
for one child, $4,800 
for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or 
more; maximimum 




for credit is $2,400 
for one child, $4,800 
for two or more; 
maximimum credit is 
20%-30% of 
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit 14%, max. $953
One child: 16.7%, 
maximum $1,192; two 
children: 17.3%, maximum 
$1,235
One child: 17.6%, 
maximum $1,324; 
two children: 18.4%, 
maximum $1,384
One child: 18.5%, 
maximum $1,434; 
two children: 19.5%, 
maximum $1,511
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $306; one 
child: 26.3%, 
maximum $2,038; two 
children: 30.0%, 
maximum $2,528
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $314; one 
child: 34%, 
maximum $2,094; 
two children: 36%, 
maximum $3,110
EITC phaseout range and rate
$10,730-$20,264, 
10%




























Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 51,300 53,400 55,500 57,600 60,600 61,200
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] 51,300 125,000 130,200 135,000 no max. no max.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Income Tax
Number of tax brackets* 5 5 5 5 5 5
Lowest individual income tax rate** 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Lowest individual income single tax 
bracket
$0-$24,000 $0-$24,650 $0-$25,350 $0-$25,750 $0-$26,250 $0-$27,050
Lowest individual income joint tax 
bracket
$0-$40,100 $0-$41,200 $0-$42,350 $0-$43,050 $0-$43,850 $0-$45,200
Other individual income tax brackets 
(percent)*, ****
28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 28, 31, 36 27.5, 30.5, 35.5
Highest individual income tax bracket 
rate
39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.10%
Rate on long-term capital gains 28% and 15%
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
10% for tax payers in the 
15% bracket or below,
20% for others
Rate on dividends  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates  = individual rates
Limitations on personal exemption and 
itemized deductions
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
Standard Deduction
$4,000 (single person) / 
$6,700 (married couple)
$4,150 (single person) / 
$6,900 (married couple)
$4,250 (single person) / 
$7,100 (married couple)
$4,300 (single person) / 
$7,200 (married couple)
$4,400 (single person) / 
$7,350 (married couple)
$4,550 (single person) / 
$7,600 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$33,750 for single filers, 
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers, 
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers, 
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers, 
$45,000 for joint filers
$33,750 for single filers, 
$45,000 for joint filers
$35,750 for single filers, 
$49,000 for joint filers
311996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tax credits
Child tax credit N.A. $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable) $500 (non-refundable)
600$, refundable up to 
10% earned income 
above $10,000, 
threshold indexed for 
inflation
Child and dependent care tax credit 
(non-refundable)*****
Maximum expenditure 
eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 




eligible for credit is 
$2,400 for one child, 
$4,800 for two or more; 
maximimum credit is 
20%-30% of 
expenditures
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $323; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,152; two children: 
40%, maximum $3,556
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $332; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,210; two children: 
40%, maximum $3,656
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $341; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,271; two children: 
40%, maximum $3,756
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $347; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,312; two children: 
40%, maximum $3,816
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $353; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,353; two children: 
40%, maximum $3,888
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $364; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,428; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,008
EITC phaseout range and rate
No children: $5,280-







































Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 62,700 65,400 68,400 72,600 76,200 80,400
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Income Tax
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 6 6 6 6
Lowest individual income tax rate** 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Lowest individual income single tax 
bracket
$0-$6,000 $0-$7,000 $0-$7,150 $0-$7,300 $0-$7,550 $0-$7,825
Lowest individual income joint tax 
bracket
$0-$12,000 $0-$14,000 $0-$14,300 $0-$14,600 $0-$15,100 $0-$15,650
Other individual income tax brackets 
(percent)*, ****
15, 27, 30, 35 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33
Highest individual income tax bracket 
rate
38.6% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35%
Rate on long-term capital gains
10% for tax payers in
the 15% bracket or
below, 20% for others
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 




Rate on dividends  = individual rates
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
5% for taxpayers in the
15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 




Limitations on personal exemption and 
itemized deductions
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation
PEP and Pease limits on 
personal exemptions and 
itemized deductions 
reduced by 1/3, 
thresholds indexed for 
inflation








$4,700 (single person) / 
$7,850 (married couple)
$4,750 (single person) / 
$9,500 (married couple)
$4,850 (single person) / 
$9,700 (married couple)
$5,000 (single person) / 
$10,000 (married 
couple)




person) / $10,700 
(married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$35,750 for single filers, 
$49,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers, 
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers, 
$58,000 for joint filers
$40,250 for single filers, 
$58,000 for joint filers
$42,500 for single filers, 
$62,550 for joint filers
$44,350 for single 
filers, $66,250 for 
joint filers
322002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Tax credits
Child tax credit
600$, refundable up to 
10% earned income 
above $10,350
1,000$, refundable up to 
10% earned income 
above $10,500
1,000$, refundable up to 
15% earned income 
above $10,750
1,000$, refundable up 
to 15% earned income 
above $11,000
1,000$, refundable up to 
15% earned income 
above $11,300
1,000$, refundable up 
to 15% earned 
income above 
$11,750
Child and dependent care tax credit (non-
refundable)*****
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 for 
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or 
more; maximum credit is 
35% (phasing down to 
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 for 1 
child; $6,000 for 2 or 
more; maximum credit is 
35% (phasing down to 
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 for 1 
child; $6,000 for 2 or 
more; maximum credit is 
35% (phasing down to 
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 for 
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or 
more; maximum credit 
is 35% (phasing down 
to 20% at $15,000 of 
AGI)
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 for 
1 child; $6,000 for 2 or 
more; maximum credit is 
35% (phasing down to 
20% at $15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible 
expenses are $3,000 
for 1 child; $6,000 for 
2 or more; maximum 
credit is 35% 
(phasing down to 
20% at $15,000 of 
AGI)
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $376; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,506; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,140
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $382; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,547; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,204
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $390; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,604; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,300
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $399; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,662; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,400
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $412; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,747; two children: 
40%, maximum $4,536
No children: 7.65%, 
maximum $428; one 
child: 34%, maximum 
$2,853; two children: 
40%, maximum 
$4,716
EITC phaseout range and rate
No children: $6,150-





increased by $1,000 for 
joint filers.  
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,240-
$11,230, one child: 
$13,730-$29,666, two 
children: $13,730-
$33,692. Increased by 
$1,000 for joint filers. 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,390-
$11,490, one child: 
$14,040-$30,338, two 
children: $14,040-
$34,458. Increased by 
$1,000 for joint filers. 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $6,530-
$11,750, one child: 
$14,370-$31,030, two 
children: $14,370-
$35,263. Increased by 




$12,120, one child: 
$14,810-$32,001, two 
children: $14,810-
$36,348. Increased by 
$2,000 for joint filers. 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
No children: $7,000-
$12,590, one child: 
$15,390-$33,241, 
two children: $15,390-
$37,783. Increased by 




Social Security tax rate (OASDI) [b] 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) [c] 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
OASDI taxable maximum earnings 84,900 87,000 87,900 90,000 94,200 97,500
HI taxable maximum earnings [d] no max. no max. no max. no max. no max. no max.
332008 2009 2008 2009
Income Tax Social Security [a]
Number of tax brackets* 6 6 Social Security tax rate (OASDI)  12.4% 12.4%
Lowest individual income 
tax rate**
10% 10% Hospital Insurance tax rate (HI) 2.9% 2.9%
Lowest individual income 
single tax bracket
$0-$8,025 $0-$8,350 OASDI taxable maximum earnings 102,000 106,800
Lowest individual income 
joint tax bracket
$0-$16,050 $0-$16,700 HI taxable maximum earnings no max. no max.
Other individual income tax 
brackets (percent)*, ****
15, 25, 28, 33 15, 25, 28, 33 Tax credits
Highest individual income 
tax bracket rate
35% 35% Child tax credit
1,000$, refundable up to 15% 
earned income above $8,500
1,000$, refundable up to 15% 
earned income above $3,000
Rate on long-term capital 
gains
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets 
Child and dependent care tax 
credit (non-refundable)*****
Maximum eligible expenses are 
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for 
2 or more; maximum credit is 
35% (phasing down to 20% at 
$15,000 of AGI)
Maximum eligible expenses are 
$3,000 for 1 child; $6,000 for 2 
or more; maximum credit is 35% 
(phasing down to 20% at $15,000 
of AGI)
Rate on dividends
0% for taxpayers in the 10%
and 15% bracket; 15% for
other brackets 
0% for taxpayers in the
10% and 15% bracket;
15% for other brackets 
EITC rate and maximum credit
No children: 7.65%, maximum 
$438; one child: 34%, 
maximum $2,917; two 
children: 40%, maximum 
$4,824
No children: 7.65%, maximum 
$457; one child: 34%, maximum 
$3,043; two children: 40%, 
maximum $5,028; three children 
45%, maximum $5,657
Limitations on personal 
exemption and itemized 
deductions
PEP and Pease limits on 
personal exemptions and 
itemized deductions reduced 
by 2/3, thresholds indexed 
for inflation
PEP and Pease limits on 
personal exemptions and 
itemized deductions 
reduced by 2/3, thresholds 
indexed for inflation
EITC phaseout range and rate
Standard Deduction
$5,450 (single person) / 
$10,900 (married couple)
$5,700 (single person) / 
$11,400 (married couple)
AMT exemption*****
$46,200 for single filers, 
$69,950 for joint filers
$46,700 for single filers, 
$70,950 for joint filers
No children: $7,470-$13,440, one 
child: $16,420-$35,463, two 
children: $16,420-$40,295, three 
children: $16,420-$43,279. 
Increased by $5,000 for joint 
filers. 
7.65%/15.98%/21.06%/21.06%
No children: $7,160-$12,880, 
one child: $15,740-$33,995, 
two children: $15,740-
$38,646. Increased by $3,000 
(indexed for inflation) for joint 
filers. 7.65%/15.98%/21.06%
Notes: 
* Married couple filing jointly
** Indexing of income brackets for individual income tax began in 1985 under ERTA81 except for 1987 and 1988 when brackets were not indexed because of rate changes; 
Changes in bracket amounts for 1985-1986, 1989-2000, and 2004-2007 occured as a result of indexing for inflation rather than from a change in tax legislation
*** 0% rate existed below these brackets until 1986
**** For years 1988-1990 rate applicable to highest income bracket is not the highest rate: 28% rate is applicable to two income brackets - the highest bracket and a lower one
[a] The taxable maximum for 1979-81 was set by statute; all other amounts were determined under automatic adjustment provisions of the Social Security Act 
according to the national average wage index. The tax rate refers to the combined rate for employers and employees.
[b] OASDI: Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
[c] HI: Medicare's Hospital Insurance program
[d] The upper limit on earnings subject to HI was repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Sources: Tax Policy Center (http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/index.cfm), Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html 
and http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html), last accessed May 2011
***** Not indexed for inflation
34Table 2: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time
data year: 1978 1978 1980 1978 1980
uprated to: 1980 1980
policy year: 1978 1978 1978 1980 1980
uprated to: 1980 1980
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 29.70 29.70 30.96 29.10 30.38 0.68 -0.58 1.26 -0.60 1.28 -0.59 1.27
P90/P10 4.63 4.63 4.90 4.48 4.78 0.15 -0.12 0.26 -0.15 0.30 -0.13 0.28
P90/P50 1.82 1.82 1.87 1.79 1.84 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05
P50/P10 2.54 2.54 2.62 2.50 2.60 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.09
Total 
change















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 1981 1981 1984 1981 1984
uprated to: 1984 1984
policy year: 1981 1981 1981 1984 1984
uprated to: 1984 1984
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 30.86 30.86 32.30 31.86 33.28 2.42 0.98 1.44 1.00 1.42 0.99 1.43
P90/P10 4.94 4.94 5.46 5.30 5.77 0.83 0.31 0.53 0.36 0.47 0.33 0.50
P90/P50 1.83 1.83 1.90 1.89 1.96 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
P50/P10 2.69 2.69 2.87 2.79 2.95 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.17
Total 
change
















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price 
inflation.
35Table 3: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time (cont.)
data year: 1986 1986 1988 1986 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
policy year: 1986 1986 1986 1988 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 33.75 33.75 34.07 34.76 35.09 1.34 1.02 0.32 1.01 0.33 1.02 0.32
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 5.93 5.98 6.02 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.05
P90/P50 1.96 1.96 1.98 2.00 2.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02
P50/P10 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.99 2.98 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Total 
change
















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 1986 1986 1988 1986 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
policy year: 1986 1986 1986 1988 1988
uprated to: 1988 1988
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 33.75 33.75 34.10 34.72 35.09 1.34 0.99 0.35 0.97 0.37 0.98 0.36
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 5.93 5.96 6.02 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
P90/P50 1.96 1.96 1.98 2.00 2.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02
P50/P10 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.98 2.98 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Total 
change
















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according to the level of mean 
nominal earnings growth.
36Table 4: Decomposing changes in income distribution over time (cont.)
data year: 1989 1989 1994 1989 1994
uprated to: 1994 1994
policy year: 1989 1989 1989 1994 1994
uprated to: 1994 1994
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 35.38 35.38 37.20 34.69 36.64 1.26 -0.56 1.82 -0.69 1.95 -0.63 1.89
P90/P10 5.87 5.87 6.43 5.61 6.13 0.26 -0.30 0.57 -0.26 0.52 -0.28 0.54
P90/P50 2.02 2.02 2.09 2.01 2.09 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07
P50/P10 2.90 2.90 3.07 2.79 2.94 0.03 -0.14 0.17 -0.11 0.15 -0.12 0.16
Total 
change
















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.
data year: 2000 2000 2004 2000 2004
uprated to: 2004 2004
policy year: 2000 2000 2000 2004 2004
uprated to: 2004 2004
Mean of Mean of
(4)-(2), (3)-(1) (2)-(1), (4)-(3)
Inequality
Gini 35.86 35.86 37.25 36.12 37.57 1.71 0.32 1.39 0.26 1.45 0.29 1.42
P90/P10 5.53 5.53 5.99 5.61 6.03 0.51 0.04 0.46 0.08 0.43 0.06 0.44
P90/P50 2.05 2.05 2.12 2.08 2.14 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
P50/P10 2.69 2.69 2.83 2.70 2.82 0.13 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.13
Total 
change
















(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(0) (4)-(2) (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Measures are based on equivalized income using the square-root of househohld size scale. Gini multiplied by 100. Uprating according the level of price inflation.











































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).

































































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Change in market income (i.e., labor + capital income) relative to base year 1978.
Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).



















































































Pre−tax (90/10) Post−tax (90/10)
Pre−tax (50/10) Post−tax (50/10)
Pre−tax (90/50) Post−tax (90/50)
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).







































































































Pre−tax inequality Post−tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).













































































































Pre−tax inequality Post−tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).






























































































Pre−tax inequality Post−tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).

































































































Pre−tax inequality Post−tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).





























































































Pre−tax inequality Post−tax inequality
Measured redistribution Pure policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).









































































Policy effect Q1 Policy effect Q2−Q4
Policy effect Q5 Total policy effect
Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: The series show the cumulative policy eﬀect on average tax rates in percentage
points. The dashed vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes
in tax legislation (section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).








































































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other eﬀect. Interpretation of policy eﬀect:
Hypothetical percentage change in post—tax income inequality compared to the previous
year if only tax parameters, tax base or brackets had changed. Other eﬀect: Hypothetical
percentage change in post—tax income inequality compared to the previous year if only the
pre—tax income distribution had changed, but policy parameters were ﬁxed. The dashed
vertical lines indicate the start of implementation of signiﬁcant changes in tax legislation
(section 3.4). Shaded areas show recession periods (NBER classiﬁcation).


























































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other eﬀect, see Figure 8.




































































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other eﬀect, see Figure 8.


































































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy and other eﬀect, see Figure 8.
































































































Source: Own calculations based on IPUMS CPS
Note: Figure shows direct policy eﬀect for all three inequality measures, see Figure 8.
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